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APPELLANTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The the District Court ! s dismissal of all of Plaintiff's
Causes of Action, being: 1) Defamation; 2) Injurious Falsehood; 3)
Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress, and 4) Invasion of

Privacy was erroneous for the following reasons:
1.

The Defendants 1 Motion for Summary Judgment

(Pages

30-39 of the record) and the trial court's MEMORANDUM DECISIONS of
11-7-84 (Pages 109-110 of the record) and 12-6-84 (Pages 119-120
of the record) were only directed

to the issues set forth in

Plaintiff's First Cause of Action

(Defamation);

1

2.

The trial court abused

apply the proper

its discretion by failing to

judicial guidelines for ruling on Summary

Judgment Mot i ons.
3.

The Court erred by abusing

its discretion

in that it

went beyond the parameters of a Motion for Summary Judgment and,
in essence, tried Plaintiff's case on the merits as opposed to
limiting

its ruling to those issues appropriately before the Court

on a Motion for Summary Judgment,
4.

The trial court erred

in that it did not view

Plaintiff's pleadings and facts in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff and make a determination as to whether
material

there were any

facts in dispute, as was required by established Utah

case law .
5.

The signing of the Order for Summary Judgment

(Pages

111-112 of the record) on 11-15-84, by the Judge, is manifest
error

in that the Order was

improperly signed prior to the

expiration of the time limits set forth

in the Rules of Practice

of the District Courts and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff
Logan, Utah.

(Appellant) was Director of Parks for the City of
On May 11, 1982 he was suspended from employment by

the Mayor of Logan, Utah, with no reasons given, pending an
investigation.

On June 7, 1982 Plaintiff

notice that the City's

(Appellant) received a

investigation was completed and that his

employment with the city was terminated.

Once again, no reasons

were given for the termination nor was the scope or findings of

2

the investigation
Plaintiff T s

revealed.

Much publicity surrounded

the

(Appellant's) suspension and termination, with the

public being made aware by the city, and/or

its employees, that an

investigation had taken place, and that a further
would continue.

Since neither

investigation

the scope nor findings of the

investigation were made public, coupled with the fact that the
Plaintiff

(Appellant) was terminated upon completion of the

investigation, an aura of suspicion, as to the conduct and acts
engaged

in by the Plaintiff

created through

innuendo.

leading

to his termination, was

Rumors and further

wrongdoing surfaced, however, Plaintiff

inuendos of criminal

(Appellant) was never

given any information as to the scope or findings of the
investigation or reasons for his firing.

After several Motions to

Dismiss were filed by the Defendants and granted, a prior appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court
remanded

(Case No. 19509) was filed.

the case to the District Court

This Court

for further proceedings.

Discovery was conducted and a Motion for Summary Judgment

(Pages

30-39 of the record) was filed by Defendants and argued before 1st
District Court Judge VeNoy Christofferson who granted Defendants 1
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant

to his 11/7/84 Memorandum

Decision. (Pages 109-110 of the record). Defendants prepared a
Proposed Order

for Summary Judgment

to which Plaintiff
record).

(Pages 111-112 of the record) ,

filed an Objection

Judge Christofferson

(Pages 113-115 of the

signed and entered

the order on 11-

15-84 and subsequently, in a 12/6/84 Memorandum Decision

(Pages

119-120 of the record), denied Plaintiff's Objection. Plaintiff

3

(Appellant) filed his Notice of Appeal

(Page 123 of the record) on

January 28, 1985.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Defendants 1 Motion for Summary Judgment

(Pages

30-39 of the record) and the trial court ! s MEMORANDUM DECISIONS of
11-7-84 (Pages 109-110 of the record) and 12-6-84 (Pages
of the record) were only directed

to the issues set forth in

Plaintiff's First Cause of Action (Defamation).
Court had no basis upon which

119-120

As such, the

to dismiss Plaintiff's Second,

Third, and Fourth Causes of Action, since each Cause of Action is
an independent
2.

theory of recovery.
The trial court abused

apply the proper

its discretion by failing to

judicial guidelines for ruling on Summary

Judgment Motions as set forth in HOLBROOK v. ADAMS, 542 P2d 191
(1975) .
3.

The Court erred by abusing

its discretion

in that it

went beyond the parameters of a Motion for Summary Judgment and,
in essence, tried P l a i n t i f P s
limiting

case on the merits as opposed to

its ruling to those issues appropriately before the Court

on a Motion for Summary Judgment.
4.

The trial court erred

in that it did not view

Plaintiff's pleadings and facts in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff and make a determination as to whether
material

there were any

facts in dispute, as was required by established Utah

case law .

4

5.

The signing of the Order

for Summary Judgment

(Pages

111-112 of the record) on 11-15-84, by the Judge, is manifest
error

in that the Order was

improperly signed prior to the

expiration of the five (5) day time limit set forth
of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure must be read
Rule 2.9(b), thus precluding
Summary Judgment until

in rule 2.9(b)

Rule 6(e) of the

in conjunction with

the Judge from signing the Order for

the expiration of eight (8) days from the

date of service of the Order on opposing counsel.

ARGUMENTS
I.

The Defendants 1 Motion for Summary Judgment

(Pages 30-39

of the record) and the trial court's MEMORANDUM DECISIONS of 11-784 (Pages 109-110 of the record) and 12-6-84 (Pages 119-120 of the
record) were only directed

to the issues set forth

First Cause of Action (Defamation).

in Plaintiff's

As such, the Court had no

basis upon which to dismiss Plaintiff's Second, Third, and Fourth
Causes of Action, since each Cause of Action
theory of recovery.

independent

As to each theory Defendants must

independently "show that there is no genuine
material

is an

fact and that the moving party

issue as to any

is entitled

to a judgment

as a matter of law". (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5 6 ) .
As can be seen from Defendants 1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Pages 35-39 of the record), dated
April

12, 1984, Defendants only attack Plaintiff's Cause of Action

for Defamation, their first Cause of Action. Further, this
MEMORANDUM states: "A careful examination of the Amended Complaint

5

indicates
damages

that

the only

arising

Defendants
whatever

therefrom."

incorrectly

r e a s o n s , and

Complaint

the

in

record),

to the

fact

its

frame

of A c t i o n ) .

the

its

record):

rise
asked

to any
for

alleged

wrong

standard

Dismiss

used
for

by

of

Though

This

the Court

error

the MOTION
and made

remains

a determination

under

that

119-120
record

to any

used

the

The

to
relief

Judgment

fact."

itself

by way

of

record),

the

the Court
to dismiss

to dismiss

6

rise

upon which

that

give

statements

JUDGMENT.

Summary

through motion
motion

or

give

of

relief

12(b) M o t i o n

of action

by

not

the Court

FOR SUMMARY

to correct

(First

does

actions

to any material

in the

attack,

109-110

or any other

in a Rule

(Pages

JUDGMENT

(Pages

due

and

its error

in the pleading

evidences

as

JUDGMENT

a statement

to the correct

attempted

FOR SUMMARY

such

a cause

issue

DECISION

still

DECISION

109-110

of action

r e c o r d ) only

do anyother

sounds

to state

"no genuine

the

(Pages

causes

compounded

on a MOTION

as opposed

12/6/84 M E M O R A N D U M
manifest

excerpt

the Court

"failure

Nor

the Mayor

in ruling

may be g r a n t e d , "
standard

by

four

or defamation

in the c o m p l a i n t .

to have been

that

Amended

issue of D e f a m a t i o n

11/7/84 M E M O R A N D U M

cause of action

of a c t i o n . "

the

further

feels

DECISION

FOR SUMMARY

30-39 of

the Court

"The Court

cause

language

for

(Pages

the

for

defamation.

on all

MOTION

The Court

the

for

that

Complaint,

conceptualized

ruled

Defendants1

a d d r e s s , and

in

a claim

and

evidences

Amended

11/7/84 M E M O R A N D U M

MEMORANDUM

stating

PlaintifPs

erroneously

that

is one of defamation
unequivocally

incorrectly

accompanying

Cause

This

read

as only making

The C o u r t ,
of

claim made

of

its
the

viewed
glasses

standards.

II.

The trial court abused

its discretion by failing to

apply the proper judicial guidelines for ruling on Summary
Judgment Motions as set forth in HOLBROOK v. ADAMS, 542 P2d 191
(1975) .
The HOLBROOK case states that: "It
summary

judgment procedure

is not the purpose of the

to judge the credibility of the

averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence.
Neither
disputed

is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve
issues of fact.

Its purpose

is to eliminate the time,

trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts
as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled
to prevail.

Only when it so appears, is the Court

justified in

refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence
and attempting

to persuade the fact trier to his views.

Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any issue, material
the settlement of the controversy, the summary

to

judgment should not

be granted."
This Court has upheld

the HOLBROOK guidelines as recently as

1984 in the case of W.W. AND W . B . GARDNER, INC. v. MANN,
23 (1984), wherein this Court, citing HOLBROOK, further
!

680 P2d
stated:

It only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the

iverments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue
)f fact.

This

is analogous

to the elemental

rule that the fact

rier may believe one witness as against many, or many against
me."

7

Summary Judgment was not appropriate

in the instant case

because genuine issues of fact and law were presented

to the Judge

and still exist.
Appellant alleged, under

the First Cause of Action

in his

Amended Complaint, that the Respondents defamed Appellant

through

various statements, actions, and inactions attributable to
Respondents, beginning on or about May 4, 1982.
pursuing

Respondents, in

their Motion for Summary Judgment attempted

the defamation

issue by submitting

the affidavit

to counter

(Pages 32-34 of

the record) of one of the Defendants, Mayor Newell Daines, wherein
he made self-serving statements and legal conclusions.

Only

paragraphs 4 and 5 of said affidavit bear directly on the
defamation

issue.

the District Court

This

is the only

in attempting

to show that there was no genuine

issue of fact as to the Defamation
hand, to show that a genuine
Defamation

item Respondents put forth to

issue.

Appellant, on the other

issue of fact existed as to the

issue, took the deposition of Dale O. Nelson (See

addendum attached hereto), and filed said deposition with the
Court.

Mr. Nelson's deposition was relied upon in Appellants

84 Memorandum

in Opposition

the record), and referred

9-5-

to Motion to Dismiss (Pages 93-100 of

to in Appellant T s oral argument

the District Court on 11-7-84 (See addendum attached

before

hereto).

Pages 8 and 9 of Mr. Nelson T s deposition put the defamation
allegation

in Appellant f s Amended Complaint squarely

in issue, at

least factually, as against Respondent Daines' Affidavit.
illustrated as follows:

8

This is

4/12/84 Daines Affidavit
(Pages 32-34 of the record)

1(4

5/23/84 Nelson Deposition

P.8 , In. 18:
"A: Well, I think the
impression one gets is that
--of course, its easy to
convict a person with
conversation, and the
impression one gets is that
there T s been some mishandling of funds, there ! s
been some misuse of
property, you know, in relation to the job, and that
sort of thing, and its never
been established that that ! s
true."
P. 10 , In.17 : "Q: In your
opinion, based upon your
knowledge of Doug and the
area here and being a long
time resident, do you feel
that — I T 11 get the exact
wording, too--do you feel
that these statements going
around impute to Doug the
commission of a crime or
degrade his character?
A: Yes, I think they do."

"That I have never at any time
publicized any reasons for the
termination of Mr. Eames, and
in particular, I have never
stated publicly or published
any statements about Mr. Eames
that were false or that could
in any way be construed as
injurious to the reputation,
name or calling of Mr. Eames."

P.11 , In.20 : "A: The whole
total ity. I think that
when the n ewspapers come
out a nd sa y that Logan Ci ty
i s making an inves t igat i on
and n ever come up wi th
any th ing a nd then in casual
conve rsat ion I hear people
sugge st or imply that
someb ody i s not doing things
T
accor ding to the way they re
expec ted t o perform, then
your lead to beli eve that
these thin gs exist, but,
!
as I said , I don t be 1i eve
!
them becau se I don t want
the p erson conv i cted unt i1
1
there s mo re evidence than
what you h ear ."

115. "I have read the Amended
Complaint and the comments
attributed to me in the allegations
are all true and were made without
ill-will or rancor toward Mr. Eames
and were made in good faith as fair
comment on public interest issues."

9

These contradictions were argued before the Judge (See
addendum attached hereto) and
Opposition
record).

to Motion

in Appellant T s Memorandum in

to Dismiss dated 9-5-84 (Pages 93-100 of the

This alone puts the issue of defamation, if nothing

else, in issue factually.
This method of placing a question of fact in issue was
recognized by this Court

in the case of FRISBEE v. KftK

CONSTRUCTION CD,, 676 P2d 387(1984) at pg. 390. This Court held:
"However, it is not always required
proffer affidavits

in order

that the opposing party

to avoid judgment against him.

Where

moving affidavits shows on its face that there is a material

issue

of fact, summary judgment may not be entered, even if responsive
affidavits are not filed."
Appellant contends that at least one issue of fact is still
in controversy, as is illustrated above, to wit: were the alleged
statements, actions, and inactions attributed
defamatory.

Appellant argues that through

to Respondents,

innuendo Respondents*

statements, actions and inactions created an impression of
wrongdoing and or criminal activity on the part of Appellant and
as such defamed Appellant.

Appellant contends that this

impression of wrongdoing or criminal activity exists in the minds
of the citizens of the City of Logan, as is evidenced by the
deposition of Dale O. Nelson, and as such Appellant has been
defamed because these impressions are false.

Respondents 1

response to these allegations and evidence are that the
impressions of wrongdoing or criminal activity have a truthful
basis. Thus it is clear on the face of this appeal

10

that there is

at least one issue of fact to be tried.

It is inherent

in the

nature of a defamation case that such a cause of action cannot and
should not be disposed of summarily.

Such a cause of action

focuses on the light in which what one person says or does is
perceived by others.

A dispute of this nature cannot be resolved,

at least factually, as this case exemplifies, on a summary basis
without

the Judge violating

forth by this Court
III.
went

the rules of summary

judgment set

in the foregoing cases.

The Court erred by abusing

its discretion

in that it

the parameters of a Motion for Summary Judgment and, in

essence, tried Plaintiff's case on the merits as opposed to
limiting

its ruling to those issues appropriately before the Court

on a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Under

the guidelines set forth

in the HOLBROOK and GARDNER

cases cited above, the Court cannot "judge the credibility of the
averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence."
To do so is to clearly go beyond the guidelines of Summary
Judgment and

into the realm of deciding

issues on their merits.

The record of the District Court evidences that the trial
entered

this forbidden territory.

Once again, referring

trial court's 11/7/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION

judge
to the

(Pages 109-110 of the

record), when the Court stated: "The Court feels that such a
statement does not give rise to any cause of action or defamation
or any other relief asked for in the complaint.
actions or statements alleged

Nor do anyother

to have been by the Mayor

in the

pleading give rise to any cause of action," it in essence stated
that

it was ruling on the credibility of the averments of the

11

parties, to wit: not believing
contained

the averments of the Appellant as

in his Amended Complaint.

This was

in direct

violation

of the HOLBROOK guidelines, as set forth on page 193 of the
HOLBROOK decision: "It is not the purpose of the summary

judgment

procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties
•• • •

The trial court further perpetuated
continued

its error when it

to state, in its 11/7/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION

(Pages 109-

110 of the record): "Nor do anyother actions or statements alleged
to have been by the Mayor
of action."

in the pleading give rise to any cause

This evidences that the Court engaged

in judging the

credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence as is further
forbidden by the HOLBROOK guidelines.
IV.

The trial court erred

in that

it did not view

P l a i n t i f P s pleadings and facts in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff and make a determination as to whether
material

there were any

facts in dispute, as was required by established Utah

case law .
In the GARDNER case, previously cited, this Court, citing
CONTROLLED RECEIVABLES, INC. v. HARMAN, 413 P2d 807,809 (1966),
held: "This Court has characterized

the motion for summary

judgment as a 'harsh measure 1 and therefore required
opposing party's contentions be considered
advantageous

in a light most

to him with all doubts resolved

permitting him to go to trial."

The record

that the

in favor of
overwhelmingly

evidences that the trial court did not adhere to this rule.

The

trial court's 11/7/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION (Pages 109-110 of the

12

record), which

is the culmination of those portions of the record

cited by Appellant

thus far, clearly shows that the Court did not

consider Respondents 1 contentions
Appellant, resolving all doubts
trial.

in a light most advantageous to

in favor of Appellant going to

By the trial court stating

that: "The Court

feels that

such a statement does not give rise to any cause of action or
defamation or any other relief asked

for in the complaint.

anyother actions or statements alleged

Nor do

to have been by the Mayor

in the pleading give rise to any cause of action," the Court once
again displays how it resolved disputed contention

in favor of

Respondents by granting Summary Judgment, as opposed
the established guidelines by resolving all doubts
permitting Plaintiff
v, MANN,
V.

to following

in favor of

to go to trial. (W.W. AND W . B . GARDNER, INC,

680 P2d 23 (1984), pg. 2 4 ) .
The signing of the Order

for Summary Judgment

(Pages 111-

112 of the record) on 11-15-84, by the Judge, is manifest error in
that the Order was improperly signed prior to the expiration of
the five (5) day time limit set forth in rule 2.9(b) of the Rules
of Practice of the District Courts. This contention points out, on
its face, manifest error on the part of the trial Judge.

The

sequence of events leading up to this error are as follows:
11-5-84

Oral arguments on Defendants 1 Summary
Motion. (Page 108 of the record)

Judgment

11-12-84 Certificate of Mailing (Page 112 of the
record), certifying mailing of
the Order for Summary Judgment on 11-12-84,
signed by the secretary for Respondents 1
counsel. However, actual envelope that Order
was mailed in shows mailing postmark of
11-13-84. (See addendum attached hereto)
11-15-84 Order

for Summary Judgment
13

received by

Plaint iff, and;
Order

for Summary Judgment signed by Judge.

11-16-84 Preparation and mailing of Plaintiff's
Objections to proposed Order for Summary
Judgment (Pages 113-115 of the record) pursuant
to Rule 2.9 of the Rules
of Practice of the District Courts.
12-6-84

Judge issues Memorandum Decision (Pages 119-120
of the record) denying
P l a i n t i f P s Rule 2.9 objections.

12-28-84 Order Denying Plaintiff's Objections to Order
for Summary Judgment (Pages 121-122 of the
record) signed by Judg.e.
As can be seen, the signing of the Order

for Summary

Judgment

(Pages 111-112 of the record) on 11-15-84, by the Judge, is
manifest error

in that the Order was

improperly signed prior to

the expiration of the five (5) day time limit set forth in rule
2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts.

Further,

Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure must be read in
conjunction with Rule 2.9(b), thus precluding
signing

the Order

the Judge from

for Summary Judgment until the expiration of

eight (8) days from the date of service of the Order on opposing
counsel.
signed

In the case at bar, the earliest

the Judge could have

the Summary Judgment Order was on 11-18-84, under Rule 2.9,

or 11-20-84, under Rule 2.9
Thus the Order

in conjunction with U.R.C.P. 6 ( e ) .

for Summary Judgment signed and entered by the

Judge, and appealed from herein, is void and constitutes manifest
reversible error. BIGELOW v. INGERSOLL, 618 P2d 50(1980) at pg.
52.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons, both factual and legal, set forth

in this

brief, Appellant contends that the trial Judge erred by abusing
his discretion and not following established

legal guidelines in

granting Respondents' Summary Judgment Motion.
As such, Appellant prays that this Court reverse and set
aside the trial court's Summary Judgment and remand
the District Court

the case to

for trial on the merits, or such other

as this Court deems appropriate under the circumstances.
DATED this 29th day of Apri

15

relief

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that they mailed four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, to:

W. SCOTT BARRETT, Attorney
BARRETT & BRADY
300 South Main
Logan, Utah 84321

on the 29th day of April, 1985.

16

ADDENDUM

RULb,^ OF PRACTICE OF THE DISTRI^i' COURTS

may request oral argument, and such request shall be granted unless the
motion has been summanl) denied If no such request is made, oral
argument shall be deemed to have been waived
(0 Provided, however, that any District Court and any Circuit Court
by order of the Judge or Judges of the court ma\ exclude that court from
the operation of this rule 2 8 in which case an alternative procedure shall
be prescnbed by written administrative order or rule.
Rule 2.9 Written Orders, Judgments, and Decrees
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining
the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time as the court
may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in
conformity with the ruling
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders shall
be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for
signature unless the court otherwise orders Notice of objections thereto
shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five (5) days after
service
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the
settlement and dismissal
Rule 2.10 Post Judgment Proceedings
(a) Motions for supplemental orders and orders to show cause shall
set forth the address of the party or parties to whom the order is issued
and all orders to show cause and supplemental orders directed to people
outside of the count\ within which the court is located shall contain the
statement "Costs, if any, and mileage, if allowed, will be assessed at the
hearing depending upon the merits "
(b) Mileage, when allowed, will be computed at the same rate as
mileage allowed to witnesses subpoenaed into such court
(c) An\ such allowances may, at the discretion of the court, be applied as a credit upon the judgment involved in the proceedings, and
when so allowed a written order to that effect shall be entered
(d) In District Court mileage shall be allowed in all cases in which
supplemental proceedings are based upon the docketing in the District
Court of a judgment entered b\ an) District Circuit, or Justice Court
located outside of the count) in which such judgment is docketed

-6-

UTAH ivULES OF C I V I L PROCEDURE, k - u E 6

(d) For Motions—Affidavits. A written motion, other than
one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by
these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause
shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion;
and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing,
unless the court permits them to be served at some other time.
(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a
party has the right or is required to do some act or take some
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a
notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served
upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

BARRETT & BRADY

1

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SOO SOUTH MAIN STREET
P. O. I O X 4 ( 1

2

L O G A N . U T A H 84321

3

(801) 7 9 3 - 4 0 0 0

4
5

Defendants
Attorneys for

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

6
7
8

DOUGLAS EAMES
Plaintiff,

9
10

ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

THE CITY OF LOGAN, a Municipal
Corp., NEWEL G. DAINES, in his
individual and official
12 capacity as Mayor of the City of
Logan, Utah; DOES 1 thru 2 5
13 individually,
11

14

Civil No.

21426

Defendants,

15
Defendants,

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

filed

a

Logan City and Newel G. Daines having heretofor

Motion to Dismiss and thereafter a Motion

for

Summary

Judgment; and
The

Court having consolidated the Defendant's Motions as

a

Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Counsel for Defendant having completed his discovery
presented

to

the

Court his Memorandum

in

Opposition

and
to

the

Argument having been held before the Court on the

5th

Defendant's Motion and
Oral

25 day of November, 1984, and
26

The

Court having considered the Affidavits suomitted by the

1

Defendants and the pleadings,

depositions submitted or argued to

2
by the Plaintiff and all other papers and pleadings in the

file,

3
and

the Court having rendered its Memorandum Decision on the 7th

4
day of November 1984,

and it further appearing

that there is no

5
genuine issue as to a material fact and that Defendants, the City
6
of

Logan,

a Municipal Corporation and Newel G.

Daines

in

his

City

of

7
individual

and

official

capacity as the Mayor of the

8
Logan, are entitled to Judgment as a matter of law; therefore,
9
It

is Ordered that Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment

10
be, and the same hereby is, granted.
11
DATED this

day of

, 1984.

12
13
14

VeNoy Christofferson, District
Court Judge

15
MAILING CERTIFICATE
16
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
17 the foregoing Order For Summary Judgment to Elliot Levine,
Attorney for the Plaintiff, 623 East First South, Salt Lake City,
prepaid
this
//)
day
of
18 Ut^h, ^ 84102, f) postage
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Elliot L e v m e
Attorney at Law
623 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS EAMES,
Plaintiff
vs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
THE CITY OF LOGAN, A Municipal
Corp., NEWELL G. DAINES, in
his individual and Officeal
Capacity as Mayor of the City
of Logan, Utha; DOES 1 thru 25
individually,

Civil No.

21426

Defendants

Defendants having filed their Motion for Summary Judgment
and the plaintiff having been given the opportunity to present
all pertinent

material they desire in connection with this motion

and counsel for plaintiff having indicated he has provided all
pertinent material conerning this motion and oral argument made
before the Court, the Court now renders its decision on the Motion
for Summary Judgment.
The first cause of action is for defamation based upon statements made by the Mayor of Logan.

The other three causes of action

are based upon those same statements, whether they be for punitive
damages or emotional distress.
It is urged by the plaintiff that the statements made by the
Mayor support the actions for defamation and that the statements
are that there was an investigation of the plaintiff and a
resultant termination.

Comments by the Mayor that were published

generally relate to the Mayor indicating that there was an
administrative investigation concerning Mr. Eames.

That Mr. Eames

was terminated and the Mayor stated the administration was complete,

no comment on any other investigation will be made by me or my office.
It appears that what the plaintiff is complaining of is the
statements by the Mayor that no comment on any other investigations
will be made by me or my office.

It apparently being the position

of the plaintiff that this leaves up in the air what are the other
investigations, and that this therefore alluding to other investigations
defames the plaintiff and he is entitled to the relief he seeks in
his first, second, third, and fourth cause of action.
The Court feels that such a statement does not give rise to
any cause of action or defamation or any other relief asked for in
the complaint.

Nor do anyother actions or statements alleged to

have been made by the Mayor in the pleading give rise to any cause
of action.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Counsel for defendants to prepare the appropriate order.
Dated this ~7 tr\ day of November, 1984.

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS EAMES,
Plaintiff
vs.
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a
Municipal Corp., NEWEL G.
DAINES, in his individual and
Official Capacity as Mayor of
the City of Logan, Utha, DOES
1 thru 25, inclusivef

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No.

21426

Defendants

Plaintiff has filed an objection to the proposed order for
summary judgment stating that the order contained in the judgment
states:
"It further appearing that there is no genuine issue as to
material facts and that the defendant, the City of Logan,
a Municipal Corporation, and Newel G. Daines, in his
individual and official capacity as Mayor of the City of
Logan, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Plaintiff considers this inaccurate as the memorandum decision
did not directly use this exact wording but stated the statements
made does not give rise to any cause of action of defamation or
any relief asked for in the complaint, nor do any other actions
or statements allege to have been made by the Mayor in the pleading
give rise to any cause of action.

Certainly the memorandum

decision implies that there is no genuine issue as to the material
facts and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Such language will be incorporated by this memorandum decision

in the previous memorandum decision, and any objections by the
plaintiff are denied.
Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate order.
Dated this Co ^i\

day of December, 1984.

1

BARRETT & BRADY

2
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3

(801) 7 5 3 - 4 0 0 0

4
5

Attorneys for
IN

6

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

7
8

DOUGLAS EAMES,

9

Plaintiff,

10

vs.

11

THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a
Municipal Corporation; NEWEL
G. DAINES, in his individual
and official capacity as
of the City of Logan, Utah;
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

12
13

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil

No.

21426

14

Defendant.
15
16

Defendants, the City of Logan, a Municipal Corporation, and

17

Newel G. Daines, being the only Defendants served in this action,

18

move the court for Summary judgment in their favor, pursuant to

19

Rule 56(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground

20

that there is no genuine issue of any material fact raised by

21

the pleadings, and the moving parties are entitled to judgment

22

as a matter of law.

23

This motion is based upon the papers and pleadings in the

24

file; the Affidavit filed herewith, and the Memorandum of Points

25

and Authorities heretofore submitted in connection with Defend-

26

ant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(e), and the further

1
2
3

supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted
herewith.
DATED th is

/2.

ti

day of April, 1984.
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W. Scott Barrett
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Attorneys for

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

7

COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

8

DOUGLAS EAMES,

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a
Municipal Corporation; NEWEL
G. DAINES, in his individual
and official capacity as
of the City of Logan, Utah;
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No.

21426

Defendant.
The Supreme Court of Utah sent this action back after the
Court's granting of a 12 B Motion to Dismiss.

The sole reason

given by the Supreme Court in its minutes was that since matters
had been considered outside the record (counsel's oral argument
were the only outside matters), the Plaintiff should have been
given time to submit additional matter.

22
To date, although the Plaintiff has taken two depositions,
23
he has not submitted any motion asking for additional time.
24
The previous Memorandum heretofore filed in support of the
25
12 (B) Motion, are again referred to in connection with this Motion
26

1

for Summary Judgment, and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by r e f e r e n c e .

2
3
4
5

I
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A CLAIM AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD BE GRANTED AS TO LOGAN CITY AND MAYOR NEWEL G. DAINES.
A Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in an action for

6

defamation and invasion of privacy, cannot be overcome by

7

assertion that there is a jury issue as to malice without show-

8

ing facts from which malice could be inferred.

9

tional privilege of free expression is involved in libel actions

10

and courts recognize the need for affording summary relief to

11

a defendant.

12

defamation actions involving a public interest matter as soon

13

as it becomes clear that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim.

14

Meeropol v. Nizer, 508 F 2d 837, Cert. Den. 434 US 1013, 54 L.ed.

15

2d 756.

16

Summary Judgment must therefore be granted in

This action has been pending now for over a year, subjecting

17

the Defendants to public questions and inquiries.

18

prayed for in the Complaint is clearly grossly excessive to the
point of being frivolous.

J5f.So
t

3

20

The amount

It is therefore time that Plaintiff be

required to show that he has a claim, or pursuant to law, Summary

n © * o
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8

Judgment should be granted.

D IN

U

D

The constitu-

A defendant is entitled to summary judgment for the alleged

£

23

defamation by a book reviewer constitute fair comment, and the

24

plaintiff failed to set forth facts which warranted a trial of

25

allegations that defendant was motivated by malice; plaintiff's

26

claim against defendants is supported only by charges based

1 upon surmise, conjecture and suspicion.
2

Guitar v. Westinghouse

Electric, 538 F.2d 309.

3

There is no doubt whatsoever that the firing of Mr. Eames

4 was a matter of public interest. He was a public official as
5
is the Mayor.

6
7
8
9
10
11

In a libel action against a public official, summary
judgment is granted to defendant where the plaintiff fails to
raise a genuine issue as to actual malice by defendant.

MacNiel

v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 66 FRD 22.
The affidavit of Mayor Daines clearly shows that there is
no genuine issue.

This is a defamation action and must stand

12 or fall on the alleged defamatory words. Not only are the words
13
not defamatory as alleged, but the Mayor has asserted that they

14
15
16
17
18
>-

2 £

Id
w

A motion for summary judgment by a defendant may be
predicated on the proposition that affirmative defenses to the
complaint exist as a matter of law, and where precise language
which is alleged to be slanderous is not identified in even

19 general fashion, the complaint fails to comply with the require-

;5NSo 20
K

are true.

ments of setting forth a cause of action.

Thompson v. Kiekhaefer
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It is submitted that even if the plaintiff proved all that
m

8

23
24
25
26

he has alleged in the Complaint, there is nothing to go to a jury,
On a motion for summary judgment by defendant in a libel
suit by a public figure, the plaintiff's version of the contested facts is to be accepted and then examined in light of

1
2

the actual malice rule to see if the material facts are in
dispute, and summary judgment for the defendant must be granted

3

if the court is able to say that a jury could not reasonably

4

find actual malice with convincing clarity.

5

Doubleday and Co., (1981 SDNY) 513 F. Supp. 1383.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that since Logan City is
immune to defamatory action, pursuant to Section 63-30-3 of the
Utah Code, and since Logan City is also immune from suit for
matters arising out of the performance of a discretionary
function, there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and
the court should therefore grant summary judgment in favor of
Logan City.

A careful examination of the Amended Complaint

indicates that the only claim made is one of defamation and
damages arising therefrom.

This issue is more fully treated in

the Memorandum previously filed and incorporated herein.
As the claim against Mayor Daines, it should be made
clear that this is not a case for wrongful discharge.

This

fact has been admitted by the Plaintiff.
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Daines, the action taken dismissing the Plaintiff, was done

OO

"

H «
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8

As appears from the affidavit of Defendant Mayor Newel G.

23
24
25
26

under the discretionary authority of the Mayor.

He chose to

dismiss Mr. Eames without cause, as he was permitted to do
under state law.

Mr. Eames has not at any time asked for a

hearing, if in fact, he felt there was an "aura of suspicion"
arising from his discharge.

1

It is respectfully submitted therefore that since Logan City

2

is immume and any statements attributed to Mayor Daines are non-

3

defamatory, and, and in any event, too, that no claim has been

4

stated against him, and there is not any genuine issue of any

5
6
7
8

material fact for trial.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that Summary Judgment
should be granted in favor of both named Defendants.
DATED this

April, 1984.

9
10

-<s%AJ^3*
W. Scott Barrett
Attorney for Logan City and
Mayor Newel G. Daines

11
12
13
14
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that true and accurate copies of the fore-

15

going Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for

16

Summary Judgment, along with supporting Affidavit of Mayor

17

Newel G. Daines, plus Motion for Summary Judgment, were mailed

18

with postage prepaid, this

19

Levine, of Anderson & Holland, Attorney for the Plaintiff, at 623

f^

day of April, 1984, to:

in
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20
:
» © * o
3

^S?I5 21

ilVJl
D

8

22
23
24
25
26

East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah

84102.

Elliott
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3
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4
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Attorneys for

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

6
7
8

DOUGLAS EAMES,

9

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

10

vs.

11

THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a
Municipal Corporation; NEWEL
G. DAINES, in his individual
and official capacity as
of the City of Logan, Utah;
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

12
13
14
15

Civil No.

21426

Defendant.

16

STATE OF UTAH

)

17

COUNTY OF CACHE

)
)

ss:

18

Newel G. Daines, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

19

Q T ) That he is the duly elected Mayor of the City of

20

Logan, Utah, a Municipal Corporation, and has served in that

21

capacity continuously since January 5, 1982.

22

(^2/

That prior to June 7, 1982, Plaintiff Douglas Eames

23

was director of the Park Dept. for the City of Logan.

24

pursuant to my discretionary powers as Mayor of the City of Logan

25

I terminated the employment of Mr, Eames, effective June 7, 1982.

26

This termination was done pursuant to authority vested in me by

Acting

1

state law, and was done without cause as permitted by state law,

2

since Mr, Eames was a department head.

3

mously approved by the Logan City Municipal Council.

4

3.

did not publicize the termination in any manner whatsoever,

6

except to answer questions from newspaper reporters who called.

7

I advised them only that the discharge was without cause.

8

media interest in the matter of Mr. Eames' suspension and dis-

9

charge was not initiated by me.

11

The

f47y That I have never at any time publicized any reasons
r

for the termination of Mr. Eames, and in particular, I have never

12

stated publicly or published any statement about Mr. Eames that

13

was false or that could in any way be construed as injurious to

,4

the reputation, name or calling of Mr. Eames.

15

\5f

I have read the Amended Complaint and the comments

16

attributed to me in the allegations are all true and were

17

made without any ill-will or rancor toward Mr. Eames and were

18

made in good faith as fair comment on public interest issues.

19
D£

Mr. Eames at no time requested any hearing, and I

5

10

>-

This action was unani-

6.

I certify that the facts stated herein are made on

UJ
u

my personal knowledge and that I am competent to testify to the
<5f„So

20

matters stated herein.
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DATED this I *•

day of April, 1984.
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Newel G. D a m e s

U

1
2

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th i s / ^

day of A p r i l ,

1984.

3
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/-*<<. / I T T ^ ^
Notary Public
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ANDERSON & HOLLAND
ELLIOTT LEVINE
Attorney for Plaintiff
623 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 8^102
Telephone: (801 )363-9J1»5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS EAMES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a
Municipal Corporation; NEWEL
G. DAINES, in his Individual
and Official Capacity as Mayor
of the City of Logan, Utah; DOES
1 through 25, Inclusive,
Defendants.

)
]
)

AMENDED COMPLAINT

\

)

CIVIL NO. 21426

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through his attorney
of record, ELLIOTT LEVINE, and for his causes of action
against the Defendants alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1*

That, at all times referred to herein, until June

7, 1982, Plaintiff was employed by the CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH
as the Director of the Parks Department; That, at all times
referred

to herein, Plaintiff was and is presently a

resident of the City of Logan, County of Cache, State of
tt&n 2.

That the Defendant, CITY OF LOGAN, was, at all

times referred
Corporation

to herein, and is presently a Municipal

organized

under

the appropriate

laws and

constitutional provisions of the State of Utah.
3.

That the Defendant, CITY OF LOGAN, pursuant to

its charter and ordinances, vests its administrative duties,
including the firing and hiring of the city's department
heads, in the Mayor; That, at all times referred to herein,
and at the present time, Defendant, NEWEL G. DAINES was
and is the elected Mayor of the CITY OF LOGAN.
4•

The true names and/or capacities of the defendants

named herein as DOES 1 THROUGH 25, INCLUSIVE, are presently
unknown to the Plaintiff at this time and as such Plaintiff
sues said Defendants by such fictitious names, however,
reserves the right to amend this COMPLAINT, in accordance
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to show said
Defendants 1

true names and capacities when such knowledge

is obtained.
5.

That, at all times mentioned herein, the Defendant,

NEWEL G* DAINES, was acting under color of his title as
Mayor of the Defendant CITY OF LOGAN*
6*

That between the dates of approximately May 4,

1932 and up until the present time, the Defendants, outside
the scope of any public meetings, official administrative
hearings, court proceedings, or within the general scope
of their duties, made various comments and statements
directed to the general public, engaged in actions which

were reported to the public, and engaged in conduct and
activities highly visible to the general public, which,
when taken together during the aforementioned puriod of
time, charged the Plaintiff with dishonesty, had a tendency
to injure the Plaintiff in his occupation and trade, imputed
the Plaintiff with committing criminal offenses, as well
as carrying

on suspect and irregular

activities

and

practices while in the employment of the City of Logan,
Utah. To wit:
a)

On

or about

Hay

4,

1982, Mayor

Daines

commenting to the Herald Journal (Logan, Utah): §Referring
to the Willow Park Zoot "But it has grown like top seed
and has become too burdensome to Logan City."
b)

May

11, 1982 letter

from Mayor Daines to

Plaintiff: "I hereby appoint Lyle Negus as acting head of
the Parks Department pending completion of the investigation
of the affairs in the Park Department*'1
c)

May 11, 1982 comment of Mayor Daines appearing

in the Herald Journal (Logan, Utah): "The investigation
should not imply that Eames is being accused of criminal
activity, Daines said»
the park

§ Willow

The City will be looking into how

Park Zoot

has been administered, not

looking for criminal impropriety*••.Daines said he feels
that Eames 1 enthusiam for the zoo has gotten out of hand
and thereis no one who is coordinating its growth*11
d)

May

18, 1982 Associated Press wire story:

"Dairies

said

warranted

f

City

had come t o h i s

an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

e)
the

information

Page 6 of

of

Logan
it

to

funding

decrease

the

1982-19 8 3 Budget
Daines:

seems p r u d e n t ,
of

that

review*

by M a y o r

consideration

attention

the

Message

"After

six

w i t h our l i m i t e d
zoo

in

the

for

months

resources,

Willow

Park

Complex • • • .Our t i m e and funds s h o u l d be expended t-o u p g r a d e
the

picnic

and p l a y g r o u n d

been c l o u d e d by Mr. Eames 1
f)
•

June

7,

facilities*

Our p e r s p e c t i v e

has

enthusiasm*."

1982 Memorandum from Mayor

Daines

*

to the Plaintiff: "Douglas Eames has been terminated as
Director of the Logan Parks Department and is discharged
from

city

employment

effective

immediately.

administrative investigation is complete*

The

No comment on

j^ny other investigation will be made by me o^ rny nffjpnThis termination is with the knowledge of the Municipal
council members."
—-^

S)

June 8, 1982 comments in the Herald Tribune

(Logan, Utah) by Mayor Dairies: " f T h e

administrative

investigation is complete, 1 Daines said in a terse news
release.

f

No comment on any other investigation will be

made by me or my office.... 1 " And comments by Logan Police
Department Detective Richard Wright: "Wright said Eames
knows why the Mayor and the police have been looking iryt£
the operation of the parks and the Willow Park Zoo**«-When
asked if the city will bring charges this time, Wright said

he is fnoi ruling out anything at this point.1"

And further

comments appearing in this article by James Thaiman: "Even
though no reasons have publicly been made, accusations
againsi

Eames

of

being

a poor administrator

and of

questionable activities in handling animals at the zoo have
surfaced • "
h)

June 9, 1982 article appearing in^the Salt

Lake Tribune: "Walhlstrora said he's not well acquainted
with Eames, but recognizes Eames has a lot of friends and
has done an energetic job for the city*

?

It seems that

sometimes an overly energetic person oversteps his bounds
and

this may have been what the mayor felt happened, 1

Wahlstrom said."
i)

July 16, 1932 article appearing in the Herald

Tribune (Logan, Utah): "Daines plan calls for parks and
recreation director, with a parks manager and recreation
manager.

The zoo curator and cemetery sexton would report

directly to the parks manager.•.» f There's a good deal of
balance with this type of administrative set-up,' Daines
told

the council* 'I think it would work well*

I think

this will save a significant amount of money and better
utilize the personnel*f"
j)

July 21, 19&2 article appearing m

the Cache

Citizen: "Eames was fired by Logan Mayor Newel Daines in
the midst of a police investigation which he ordered to
search out alleged miscouduct in the park's department.

After sacking Eames the mayor declined to say why noting
that the investigation was continuing with the possibility
that the findings could

be turned

attorney for possible legal action.
ago.

over to the county

That was several weeks

Eames said he hasn f t been told anything since the

firing about the investigation•

He was placed on a leave

of absence during part of the investigation prior^to being
sacked*

The Citizen contacted Logan Police chief Ferris

Groli Monday who said he was briefed about a week ago by
the detective looking into the matter- 'He was esentiaily
finished,1 Groll said.

f

He didn't see that there were going

to be too many problems,' he added, indicating the detective
had found little to forward to the county attorney-

Some

of ihe records were a little hard to find, Groll said.
And the detective is waiting for a few other records yet
to be inspected."
7•

That the foregoing

words and actions of the

Defendants were printed in various newspapers throughout
the City of Logan, Cache County, Utah, and Salt Lake County,
Utah; Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants' words and
actions were printed and transmitted by the wire services
and as such appeared throughout various newspapers and other
publications throughout the United States*
§•

Said defamatory matter wac, and is, false ~nd was

known by Defendants to be false when made and was published
with actual malice and with the wrongful, wilful, wanton

i n t e r ) i, of
of

injuring

feelings

political

hatred,

the

desi.ru

resignation

motivated

ill-will,

and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

and w i l l i
inio

of

plaintiff,

by t h e

jealousy,

beliefs

his

position

and

diverse

toward t h e f i r *

lo oppress the P l a i n t i f f

from

existence

as

~;

and f o r c e

Director

of

rr

him

Parks

f o r Ine C i t y of Logan*
9*

As a d i r e c t and p r o x i m a t e r e s u l t of t h e

statements,
and

Plaintiff

ridicule.

been

Further,

a source

Plaintiff

of

for

i n t h e amount of
10#

statments

and h u m i l i a t i o n

Plaintiff

to suffer

which

Plaintiff

should

and h a s

1982,

materially

affected

Plaintiff
the

City

for

the

his

lost

his

of

distress

be awarded damages

of s a i d

t h e C i t y of

b e e n unemployed s i n c e h i s

termination

future

position

defamatory

prospects

of

employment

and p e r m a n e n t l y l e s s e n e d and

Logan,

Utah,

defamatory

for

Defendants
is

some t i m e

statements

in

the

By r e a s o n of t h e f o r e g o i n g ,

Plaintiff

were

entitled

to

by

but
the

has been

$10,000,000.00.

defamatory

wilful,

with

future

conduct

said

were

decreased.

and

Since

the

with

damaged i n t h e sum of

Plaintiff

to

had an e x p e c t a n c y of r e t a i n i n g h i s p o s i t i o n ,

Defendants.

11.

mental

have

$10,000,000.00.

Plaintiff

Utah,

contempt

and a c t i o n s

the

on J u n e 7 ,

further

said

exposed to public

As a d i r e c t and p r o x i m a t e r e s u l t

statements,
Logan,

been

embarrassment

causing

and a n g u i s h

has

d'efamatory

statements

malic ious,
recover

and

and

exemplary

conduct

by

intentional,
and

punitive

damages in the amount of $10,000,000.00.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
12#

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by

reference those allegations set forth under paragraphs 1,
through and including, 8 under his First Cause of Action,
above, as though set forth in haec verba*
13*

Said defamatory statements were.made maliciously,

without any justification, and with wilful intent to injure
Plaintiff*
earning

As a result Plaintiff suffered a loss in his

capacity

retirement

as well as having his pension and

benefits impaired.

Further, Plaintiff was

injured in his good name and reputation and has suffered
great personal discomfort all to his damage in the amount
of $10,000,000*00.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
14*
reference

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by
those allegations set forth above, under his

Second Cause of Action, as though set forth in haec verba*
15*

That Defendants 1 actions constituted extreme and

outrageous conduct on their part*
16*

That Defendants 1 actions were carried out with

the intent of causing Plaintiff severe emotional distress
to a degree that he would be forced into resigning from
his position as the Director of Parks for the City of Logan
and, further, to stifle Plain tiff's opposition to the
Defendants 1 administrative policies regarding the operation
of the City's Parks Department and in particular, the Willow

Park Zoo,
17*

As a d i r e c t and p r o x i m a t e r e s u l t of s a i d

Plaintiff

has

emotional

b e e n damaged

distress,

c o n f i d e n c e and

in

that

sleepless

actions,

he has s u f f e r e d

nights,

and

severe

a loss

of

herein

by

self-esteem.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

18*

Plaintiff

reference
Second,

realleges

and i n c o r p o r a t e s

t h o s e a l l e g a t i o n s s e t f o r t h above under h i s
and T h i r d

C a u s e s of

Actions,

as though

First,

set

forth

i n haec v e r b a *
19and

Defendants1

That

unreasonable

actions

invasion

of

resulted

the

in a

PiaintiffTs

serious
right

of

privacy.
20.
which

Defendant's

placed

the P l a i n t i f f

l i g h t within his
21.

as

a

and h i s

reputation

publicity
in a

false

community*

As a r e s u l t

has s u f f e r e d
and

a c t i o n s created widespread

severe

result

of

Defendant's

emotional
has

actions,

distress

been

damaged

Plaintiff

and m e n t a l
in

the

anguish
sum

of

$10,000,000.00.
22.

The w o r d s and a c t i o n s

projected

Plaintiff

in

a

of

false

the
light,

Defendants,

which

were p r i n t e d

v a r i o u s n e w s p a p e r s t h r o u g h o u t t h e C i t y of Logan, Utah,
County,

Utah,

aforealleged
and r e s u l t e d

and

Salt

invasions

of

Lake

County,

privacy

Utah;

were*done

in

Cache

that

the

with

malice

b e c a u s e of t h e e x i s t e n c e of f e e l i n g s of

hatred,

ill-will, jealousy, and diverse political and administrative
beliefs between the Defendants and Plaintiff and thus the
awarding of exemplary and punitive damages in the amount
of $10,000,000*00 is justified*.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally as
follows:
1.

Under Plaintiff's First Cause of Action:
a* For damages in the sum of $10,000,000.00;
b. For exemplary and punitive damages in the
sum of $10,000,000-00;

2.

Under Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action:
a. For damages in the sum of $10,000,000*00*
b* For exemplary and punitive damages in the
sum of $10,000,000-00.

3«

Under Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action:
a* For damages in the sum of $10,000,000*00*
b. For exemplary and punitive damages in the
sum of $10,000,000*00.

4.

Under Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action:
a. For damages in the sum of $10,000,000.00*
b* For exemplary and punitive damages in the
sum of $10,000,000.00.

5*

Under each cause of action for costs of suit herein

incurred;
6.

Under each cause of action for such other and

further relief as the Court deems appropriate under the
circumstances*
DATED this 10th day of June, 1933-

ANDERSON & HOL

Plaintiff's Address:
915 Park Ave*
Logan, Utah 84321
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original of the forgoing AMENDED COMPLAINT, postage.prepaid,
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foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT, postage prepaid, to: Scott
Barrett, Attorney for Defendants, 120 North 100 West, Logan,
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2
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3
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5
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7
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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
OF PROCEEDINGS

-vsTHE CITY OF LOGAN, et al.,

8

Defendants,

9
10

ARGUMENTS ON DEFENDANTS 1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY

11

JUDGMENT held in the above-entitled court and cause on the

12
13
14

fifth day of November, 1984, commencing at 2:20 o'clock p.m.,
before the Hon. VeNoy Christoffersen, District Judge, presiding.

15
16

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff

ELLIOTT LEVINE, ESQ.
623 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

For the Defendants

W. SCOTT BARRETT, ESQo
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300 South Main St.
Logan, Utah 84321
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20
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22
23
24
25

GEORGE A. PARKER
Registered Professional Reporter
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Logan, Utah 84321

1

2

?.^22Irl2IiI2S

3
4

THE COURT:

This is Eames v s . the City of Logan,

5

et a.!., in which there was a request for oral argument.

6

assume that all discovery and all pleadings and answers and

7

responses have been filed; is that correct?

8

MR. BARRETT:

9

MR. LEVINE:

10
11
12

I

Correct.
On behalf of the plaintiff, yes, to

this time.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So now there just remains your

oral argument and how you want that related to whatever you

13 ™ a Y have filed and what depositions may have been taken.
14

MR. LEVINE:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BARRETT:

That's correct, Your Honor.
Okay.

Mr. Barrett.

Your Honor, after this matter was

17 sent back on I think what we all recognize as a technicality,
18 the plaintiff noticed fifteen depositions.

Thirteen of them

19 were taken, two people didn't show up, not having been sub20 poenaed, and now in defense to the defendant's motion for
21 summary judgment, only one of these thirteen depositions is
22 even referred to by the plaintiff, and that's the deposition
23 of a cousin, who a d m i t s — a cousin of the plaintiff—who
24 admits he really knows nothing except the rumors he's heard
25 and what he's read in the paper.

-3-

The defendants have filed an affidavit in support
of motion for summary judgment, which I think is dispositive
really as far as the Mayor, Newell Daines, is concerned.
There are no counter affidavits of any kind on file, contrary
to the requirements of Rule 56.

The only defense the

plaintiff attempts to raise to the defendants motion for
summary judgment is that somehow Logan City should not have
government immunity to a defamatory action as the lav; clearly
says in the State Code, because, as now, the plaintiff,
contends for the first time in letting Mr. Eames go the City
of Logan was acting in a proprietary capacity.
Well, I think the court will recognize that this
is nonsense.

Personnel in the municipal are not proprietary

but are governmental.
When Mr. Levine was asking for additional time to
take more depositions, he filed an affidavit dated April 22,
1934, saying that he couldn't defend against defendant's
notions because all of the information of alleged wrongdoings
was in the possession df the defendants.

So now he's taken

all the depositions that he wants to take and has come up witlji
absolutely nothing to show that there is any claim that he
can state against the City or the Mayor.
It's therefore submitted that nothing has changed
since our first motion, which was granted by the court, ard
that the position of the defendants is indeed stronger with.

1

an affidavit on file, additional memoranda filed, fifteen

2

depositions noticed, thirteen taken, nothing to add to the

3

allegations of the complaint, which are only in general terms

4

and which do not state a claim.

5

that summary judgment should be granted.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. LEVINE:

So w e , therefore, submit

Mr. Levine.
Your Honor, I think about the only

8

thing that we agree upon as to what's before the court today

9

is a motion for summary judgment.

10

to point out that as a motion for summary judgment we must

n

apply the civil procedure rules and the rules of law and case

t2

law regarding summary judgment.

13

referred on page 5"o£ my memorandum in opposition to the

First of all, I would like

Those rules and law are

14 motion to dismiss.
15

In particular I'd like to point out the case of

16

Holbrook Company vs. Adams, at 542 P2d 191, a 1975 Utah case.

17

I seem to have omitted that cite from the quote that I took,

18

but what it says, what the case says is that it is not the

19

purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the

20

credibility of the averments of the parties, or witnesses,

21

or the weight of evidence.

22

the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact.

23

Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense

24

of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted

25

by the party ruled against he would not be entitled to

Neither is it to deny parties

-5-

1

prevail.

2

Only when it so appears is the court justified in

refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his

3 !

evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his

4

views.
5I

Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any issue,

material to the settlement of the controversy, the summary

6

judgment should not be granted.

7

Based on that premise, Your Honor, we must now

8

look at the pleadings under these summary judgment rules.

9

The amended complaint contains four causes of action.

10

first cause of action, defamation—

11 !
12

The

THE COURT:

Now are you talking about the amended

one?

13

MR. LEVINE:

Yes, Your Honor, the amended one.

14

THE COURT:

Let me find that so I know what you're

15

talking about.
16

MR. LEVINE:

All right.

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

Now where are you referring now?

18

MR. LEVINE:

Okay.

To our first cause of action.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. LEVIN:

The first cause of action in the

20
21

amended complaint is for defamation; second cause of action,
22

what we would categorize as injurious falsehood; third cause
23

of action, intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
24

fourth cause of action, what we would term invasion of
25

privacy.

-6-

1
2

As to the second, third and fourth causes of
action, nothing has been put forth by the defendants in any

3 of their pleadings to dispel, counter, or negate either
4

factually or legally those causes of actions or the averments

5

contained therein.

6

two, three;?and four, must stand as is and cannot be defeated

Therefore, those causes of actions,

M by a summary judgment motion,
8
9

The only cause of action which defendants attempt
to bombard is the first cause of action for defamation*

As

10

to the first cause of action it is our position that there

11

are genuine issues as to fact and law as follows:

The main

12 question is questions of fact and law as to whether the
13 statements of the Mayor and/or Richard Wright were defamatory
*4

They say no, we say yes.

15

our position, our affirmative position that they

1

are defamatory, is based upon basically the comments which

*7

were delineated in paragraph—excuse m e , on pages 3 and 4 of

18

the amended complaint, which is paragraph 6 of the complaint.

19

In specific I'm referring to subparagraph

6

20 of the complaint.

(b), ( f ) , and (g)

Paragraph 6 of the complaint.

21

in all of those instances—and it is not denied

22

even by the affidavit of the Mayor, that those statements

23 were made regarding an investigation.
24

Paragraph 6 ( b ) , to

J the effect, and I quote in p a r t — w e l l , I'll read this in

25 full:

"I hereby appoint Lyle Negus as acting head of the

-7-

1

Parks Department pending completion of the investigation of

2

affairs in the Parks Department."

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. LEVINE:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. LEVINE:

Now this is subparagraph (d)?
Excuse me, this is sub (b).
Okay.
Okay.

And I might point out that all

7

of these—that that first sub (b) was in a letter from Mayor

8

Daines -to the plaintiff, Mr. Eames, which was later published

9

and became public knowledqe.

10
n

Subparagraph (f), the June 7, 1982, memorandum from
Mayor Daines to the plaintiff, which again was published:

12 "Douglas Eames has been terminated as Director of the Logan
13 Parks Department and is discharged from City employment
14 effective immediately.
15 complete.

The administrative investigation is

No comment on any other investigation will be made

16 by me or my office.

This termination is with the knowledge

17 of the Municipal Council members."
18

And I add emphasis to

that part of that memorandum which says, "Mo comment on any

19 other investigation will be made by me or my office.11
20
21

Subparagraph (g) , June 8, 1982, comments in the
Herald Tribune (Logan, Utah) by Mayor Daines: "'The administrative investigation is complete/1 Daines said in a terse

23

nevvs release.

24

made by me or my office....1"

25

Department Detective Richard Wright:

'Mo comment on any other investigation will be
And comments by Logan Police
"Wright said Eames

-8-

knows why the Mayor and the police have been looking into the
operation of the parks and the Willow Park Zoo.

When asked

if the City will bring charges this tine/ Wright said he is
'not rulirg out anything at this point. 1 "
As you can see from those comments, there is a
definite, specific reference macfe to other investigations.
Our whole contention is that these references to other
investigations fall within the gambit of defamation.

They

definitely put Mr. Eames's character in question, his reputation in question.

"What went on?"

Well, the whole question here—and the defendants
kind of play these back and forth and get them confused; we
have no qualms with their assertion that the Mayor had the
right to fire Mr. Eames.

We have no qualms with that.

What

we're talking about is the way in which he went about firing
Mr. Eames.

What we're talking about is the comments made

pursuant to the firing and termination, the way the matter
was handled subsequent to that.

There's right way to

terminate somebody and wrong way to terminate somebody.

The

wrong way, which we allege they terminated Mr. Eames, resulte<jl
in defamation, and that's the whole key issue in this case
that we're asserting.
As to our discovery—and we did take a lot of
depositions, but under the rules for summary judgment we
don't have to prove our whole case today.

We only need to

-9-

rely on those items v/hich we feel show the court that there
are genuine issues of fact and law; and to carry it further
I refer to the deposition, the deposition of Richard Wright,
which was taken on the 19th of March, 1984, and in specific
page 4.
MR. BARRETT:

I'm going to object to Mr. Levine

referring to anything he hasn't already submitted to the
court.

I think the rules require that any affidavits in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment must be on file
before the hearing.
MR. LEVINE:

I'm not talking about affidavits, I'm

talking about depositions that were filed with the court,
and I would—
THE COURT:

That's what I'm looking at.

I don't

have that one.
MR. LEVINE:

Okay.

I have a popy here if Your

Honor would like to look at it.
THE COURT:
MR. LEVINE:

Well, do you plan on filing one?
It was my understanding that they all

were filed with the court.
THE CLERK:

I brought everything we had in there.

THE COURT:

I have the deposition of Dale Nelson,

Joseph Sheen, Edward Dowd, and that's all that we have filed.
MR. LEVINE:

Okay.

I'll check into that and find

out what the status of that is, but it was my understanding

-10-

that they had all been filed with the court, but I'll check
on that and I'll leave it up to the court's discretion
whether the court wants me to refer to Mr. Wright's deposition.
THE COURT: Well, in your argument you may refer
to it, certainly.
MR. LEVINE: Okay.
THE COURT: And if I feel it has any relevance, of
course, I'd have to see the deposition first.
MR. LEVINE: Okay.

Page 4 of Mr- Wright's deposi-

tion, and beginning at line 20: (Reading)
"Q

Do you do just criminal investigations or civil

investigat ions?
"A

I don't do civil investigations.

Criminal investi-

gations. n
Then we turn over to page 11 of Mr. Wright's
deposition, Richard Wright's deposition, line 10: (Reading)
"Q

Has the investigation that you are handling

regarding Doug Eames been closed or is it still open?
M

A

H

Q

It is still open.
How long do you anticipate that it will remain

open?
W

A

I have no idea.

I suppose when the statute of

limitations would run, which is about four years, I believe."
And then at the bottom of page 11: (Reading)

-11-

,f

1
2

Q

"A

4

Well, I consider it still open, an active case."
Page 12: (Reading)

5

"Q

Are you still gathering information and checking

leads?

7

"A

8
9

Is it

suspended right now?

3

6

What status is Doug Eames's case assigned?

Yes.11

|

I think the court can see from that that that

j

substantiates our allegations in that when the Mayor made

10

those statements there was an active investigation going on,

11

and I think that definitely creates after all of this t i m e —

12 we are talking about over two years later; there's still an
13

investigation that's open, information being gathered.

14 What's it about?
15

tion.

What's happening?

We're past that era of law.

This is not an inquisiPeople have to be given

16 answers.
17

Also referring to the deposition of Dale O. Nelson,

18 pages 8 and 9.
19

"Q

I will start with page 8, line 14:

Well, j u s t — y o u know, truthfully, what kind of

20 impression you get from everything that's going on as
21 basically a resident of the City of Logan.
22

23
24

25

That's basically

what I'm trying to get.
"A

Well, I think the impression that one gets is that,

of course, it's easy to convict a person with conversation,
I and the impression that one gets is that there's an investi-

-1

1

gation going o n , that there's b e e n s o m e m i s m a n a g e m e n t of

2

f u n d s , there's b e e n some misuse of p r o p e r t y , you k n o w ,

3

relationship

4

to the j o b , and that sort of t h i n g , and

never b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d

5

that that's

O v e r o n page 9, line 1:

6

"It's a little b i t annoying

it's

true."
(Reading)

to m e as a c i t i z e n to

7

those k i n d s o f allegations and not to h a v e any

8

from i n v e s t i g a t i o n s or o t h e r w i s e , and I've

9

I've

11 i m p l i c a t i o n

see

substantiation

never seen t h a t ,

never heard it s o , you k n o w , a p e r s o n would b e a

10 b i t disturbed

in

little

a t n o t having b e t t e r i n f o r m a t i o n , and y e t

is that somebody's not doing

the

the right thing

as

12 far as the job is c o n c e r n e d . "
13
14
15
16
17
18

I

think that definitely p u t s in i s s u e , b o t h

of fact and l a w , a s to the d e f a m a t i o n q u e s t i o n .

issues

Mr. Nelson,

w h a t e v e r h i s s t a t u s , e v e n h i s cousin o r w h a t e v e r , he's
citizen o f L o g a n and he's entitled

to give his o p i n i o n .

q u e s t i o n and a n s w e r was never objected to in the
o n any g r o u n d s , Your H o n o r .

a
That

deposition

S o , t h e r e f o r e , I say as to the

19 d e f a m a t i o n i s s u e o n t h a t b a s i s alone there's enough to p u t
20 this m a t t e r b o t h legally and factually at i s s u e .
21
22

A n o t h e r issue which I say is in f a c t — e x c u s e
another legal and factual

issue which

is p r e s e n t a t this

23 and m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , go to trial are the statements
24
25

in p a r a g r a p h

6(a) through

I just r e f e r r e d t o .

me;

set

time
forth

(j) of the c o m p l a i n t , p a r t of w h i c h

The amended

complaint.
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1

THF COURT:

You're s t i l l t a l k i n g about the

first

2 ,
cause of action?
3|

MR. LEVINE:

Right.

First cause of action.

Those

4,
are the subparagraphs
51

6

THE COURT:

(a) t h r o u g h —
Are you talking about (h), (i) , and (j)

•

now?
7

MR. LEVINE:

N o , I'm talking a b o u t — I guess all

8
1
9

10

of paragraph 6.

'

THE COURT:
MR. LEVINE:

Okay.
But specifically subparagraphs (a)

11

'through (j), which in the amended complaint came about becaus^

1

'the court required that we specify what we were referring to

13
when we talked about defamation, so we set forth in (a)
14 I
through (.j) these specific instances, and what I determine as
15
.
i
a fact between the court, before the court, which is at issue J
what
16 I
,
the defendants say that—/they try and do is take every
17
separate incident independently and say, "Mo, that's not
18
19
20
21

defamation, no, that's not defamation, (b) is not defamation,
(c) is not defamation."
Our position on that is that you have to take the
whole sequence of events, the whole circumstances into con-

22
sideration.
23
24
25

You can't put this on the chopping block and

take it part by part.

We're talking about a continuing

defamation, and you have to talk about a time period beginning
when Mr. Eames was terminated up until the present when an

-14

1

investigation is supposedly still going on, some two or two

2

and a half years later, and that is at issue before the

3

court.

4

Are each one of these incidents supposed to be

5

taken separately or are we supposed to look at the totality

6

of circumstances, which is what we assert is what the law

7

says?

8

There is also a question or law as to the status

9 J of the parties involved.

Are we talking about public figures

10

or private figures?

It depends on at what point in time

11

we're looking at.

12

considered—and it's a legal detemination—a public figure,

13

but was he a private figure when he was suspended?

14

an issue of law for the court to determine, and it has

15

direct bearing on the first cause of action in that based

At one time Mr. Eames could possibly be

That's

16 J upon the status of the parties it limits certain defenses
17

that are available to the defendants.

There are also

18 J questions of law as to the defenses applicable to the
19

defendants.

Are they entitled to the fair comment defense,

20

are they entitled to the truth defense?

21

are they entitled to?

What other defenses

These are questions of law which only

22 I come about at a trial when the court determines what the
23 J status of the parties are involved in this matter.
24

25

The other question of law and fact which we assert
is presently at issue and is not resolved by the pleadings

-15-

on their face is the defendant's assertion that Utah Code
Annotated Section 63-30-10 et sec is applicable in this
matter, and referring to ny memorandum it's our position
that the injuries resulted from a decision at an operational
level.

Those matters which concern routine, everyday

matters, and is not a governmental function.

Thus it's out-

side of the scope of 63-30-10(a) and 63-30-10(3) and the
Governmental immunity Act as a whole.
The actions which caused the injuries complained
of were not as a result of the exercise and discharge of a
governmental function but were, if anything, the result of
the exercise of a proprietary function and are thus not
subject to governmental immunity.

It's not

the firing,

once again, of Mr. Eames, but the way in which it was carried!
out, the comments made pursuant to the termination and
firing, and the stage set by the .Mayor and/or Richard Wright
vis-a-vis their comments and conduct and course of investiga-j
tion.

And those actions, those statements made do not fall

within the purview of governmental immunity.
Therefore, it's our position that the motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
Further, the affidavit of the Mayor adds nothing
to this matter.
problem with.

The first three paragraphs we have no

They have no bearing at all on this case.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 are merely legal conclusions, what I
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1

I assert are legal conclusions by the Mayor.

2

I serving legal conclusions.

3

j contradict those.

4
5

They are self-

There's no way that we can

I mean the Mayor says in paragraph 4,

"I have never at any time publicized any reasons for the
I termination of Mr. Eames, and in particular I have never

6

stated publicly or published any statement about Mr. Eames

7

that was false or that could in any way be construed as

8

injurious to the reputation, name, or calling of Mr. Eames."

9

That's a legal conclusion.

That's fine.

That's

10 J the Mayor's view, but that's a legal question that has to be
n

answered either by the court or by a jury at trial.
Paragraph 5 is the same.

12

Paragraph 5 says, "I

13

have read the amended complaint and the comments attributed

14

to me in the allegation"—excuse me.

15

Paragraph 5:

16

comments attributed to me and. the comments attributed to me

17

in the allegations are all true and were made without any ill

18

will or rancor toward Mr. Eames or made in good faith as fair

19

comment on public interest issues."

20

Let me start over.

"I have read the amended complaint and the

Well, that's fine, but once again it's self-

21

serving.

22

statements were true and, therefore, he's setting up the

23

What the Mayor is trying to do is say that the

] truth defense and that he was merely making fair comment on

24

public interest issues.

25

no determination that this is a public interest issue.

Well, that's fine, but there's been
That'

-1

another matter that has to be determined, a legal matter
that has to be determined by the court or jury at trial.
It's nice that the Mayor says that, but, as I said, it's
strictly self-serving and a legal conclusion.
That's the reason why we didn't feel it's necessary
to respond to this affidavit, because it doesn't add anything of substance to any of the issues in the case and,
8

9

[ therefore, it's our feeling that based upon our argument,
all the pleadings, the depositions that we referred to,

10

which I feel are all that are needed at this point in time,

11

there are definite issues of fact and law which must go to

12

the jury or Your Honor at a trial,

13

matter is subject to summary judgment motion based upon

14

those grounds, Your Honor.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

THE COURT:

I don't think this

Maybe I could ask you a couple of

questions in regard to it.
MR. LEVINE:
THE COURT:

Sure.
Generally your causes of action, both

the first, the second and the third and fourth, the first
one being defamation, your second cause of action being for
punitive damages, alleging that it was willful and malicious; your third cause of action alleging that based on
the same statements you allege in your first cause of action^
that this caused emotional distress and raised an additional

25
cause of action because of the emotional distress; and your
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fourth cause of action, based upon the same things, the same
2
statements you allege were made in the first cause of action,
3

that again this is v/ith malice and should be punitive damages
4

that relate to, again, your third cause of action.
5

So essentially you're relying then on the state6

ments made in the first cause of action to support the relief
you ask in the balance of your amended complaint; is that
8

correct?
9

.
MR. LEVIHE:

Well, Your Honor, what we're setting

out are four specific causes of action,
11

THE COURT:

True.

12

MR. LEVINE:

Four t h e o r i e s of r e c o v e r y , and e a c h

13

cause of action we incorporate by reference the preceding
14

allegations as the basis for that.
15
THE COURT:

Right.

I understand.

.
But just so that

16

I understand, it's these statements that you feel support the
relief that you're asking in your other cause of action, be
18

it punitive relief or otherwise.
19

MR. LEVINE:

That's correct,

Your Honor.

20
THE COURT:

Okay.

Then I would like to ask: In

21
relating to those elements or statements set out, sub (a)
22
through (j), rather than, as you say, taking one and say,
23
"How does this relate to defamation, (a)"—you know, "It's
24
grown like Topsy and become burdensome," or "I appoint Lyle
25
Negus for the completion of an investigation in the Parks
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1

Department."

2

but (f) does refer to an investigation, and also (g), that

3

"The administrative investigation is complete, no further

Further statements (c), (d), (e)—well, not (e) j

4
comment will be made."
5

Taking them all together, as you pointed out, and
looking at the whole picture, taking all of those comments
together reveal anything other than statements made by the

8

Mayor that there was firing of Mr. Eames, that there was an

9

investigation of the Parks Department and an administrative

10

investigation being made about that department and Mr.

11

Eamesfs involvement?

12

collectively that all of those statements say?

13

MR. LEVINE:

14

statements say?

15

gation.

16

made public.

17

18
19
20
21
22

25

Collectively that all of those

There are references made to another investi-f

This mysterious other investigation.

It has been

It's never been resolved.

T H E C O U R T : By w h o ?
M R . L E V I N E : By the M a y o r .
THE COURT:
MR. LEVINE:
subparagraph

W h e r e did he ever say
I'll

that?

refer to once again

specifically

(f) in the m e m o r a n d u m from Mayor Daines to

p l a i n t i f f , w h i c h , as I s a i d , w a s published to third

23 as is required under
24

Is there anything other than that

the

parties

defamation.

It s a y s , "Doug E a m e s has been terminated

as

director o f the L o g a n Parks D e p a r t m e n t and is d i s c h a r g e d

from
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x

City employment effective immediately.

2

investigation is complete."

3

comment on any other investigation will be made by me or my

4

office."

5

The administrative

And he goes on to say, "No

Up until this point nobody really knew

about any

6

other investigation.

7

immediately that says that there are other investigations

8

taking place, and that creates more turmoil, more questions.

9

What other investigations?

When you say "any other investigation,"

What are they checking into?

10

Who's doing the investiqation, the F.B.I. , the C.I.A., the

11

National Security Council, the City of Logan?

The Mayor made

12 a specific reference to any other investigations which may be
13

taking place specifically, once again, in subparagraph (g).

14

The Mayor once again said, "No comment on any other investi-

15

gation will be made by me or my office."

16

gation?

17

question in at least one person's mind, "What's the investi-

What other investi-

We've shown through depositions that it raised a

gation about?"

It creates a suspicious type atmosphere.

19

What's going on, what did he do wrong?

20

about this aura that there's another investigation going on,

21

there were wrongdoings that were done, possible mismanagement

22

who knows what else.

23

that by Richard Wright's deposition that two and a half years

24

later they're still in a position, there's still an open

25

investigation file, for what purpose nobody knows.

By innuendo it puts

Criminal, whatever.

And we confirm
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THE COURT1:

1
2

and Mr. Eames?

But i s n ' t t h a t between t h e C i t y

Police

W h a t ' s t h a t a o t t o do w i t h t h e M a y o r ' s comment}

i
that as far as his administrative investigation is concerned

3
4

i t ' s closed?
MR. LEVINE:

Well, I think there is a duty, and as

5

I said this g o e s —
6

THE COURT:

But would you have him say, "Our

7

administrative investigation is completed and closed, but
8

it's within ny knowledge that the City still has an open file
9

and as far as I know it's still an open file and is under
10

investigation"?

What if he'd said that?

Would that have

11

taken him off the hook?
12

MR. LEVINS:

No, it wouldn't have taken him off the

13

hook, no,
14

THE COURT:

Apparently it's a true statement, from

15

your depositions.
16

MR. LEVINE:

Well, and the ^ayor admits it's a

17

true statement, but what we're saying is that incumbent with
18

making this statement there's also a duty to clear up the
19

error afterwards.
20

THE COURT:

Well, where does his duty lie then?

21
22

What should he have done?
MR. LEVINE:

What should he have done?

He should

23

have made public at some point in time what exactly the
24

investigation is, what it was that they were investigating.
25
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1

Things like that.

2

whole thing.

3

a very simple thing.

4

investigated for this, that or the other," and at least let

5

Mr* Eames know.

6

kind of all of a sudden suspension, investigation, the

7

investigation is complete, that's it, and then he's fired,

8

he doesn't even know.

9

It's a very simple thing.

That's the

This whole thing could have been avoided.

It's

Call him in, say, "Look, you're being

But when you have this controversy, this

I'm not saving—once again, the Mayor has every

10

right to fire him, for whatever reasons; that's not in con-

11

tention.

12

of an aura, Mr. Eames doesn't even know what investigation,

13

baloney, whatever is going on.

14

THE COURT:

15
16

17

But what I'm saying is when you create this kind

knew?
MR. LEVINE:

Well, the Mayor certainly knew other

investigations were going on.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. LEVFIE:

20

Is there any indication the Mayor

Yes, that's what I say.
And he knew an administrative

investigation had taken place and was concluded.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. LEVINE:

Right.
But when you take that coupled with

23

a subsequent', termination, right there, without coming

24

forth and stating, "Well, I terminated Mr. Eames and the

25

reason I terminated Mr. Eames is because our investigation
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you leave this defamation.
It's strictly defamation.

That's the only word I can find.
When he sets into progress these

comments that create questions in people's minds and through
innuendo--I mean it's clear that just those statements in and
of itself without a further explanation, which should have
taken place either to Mr. Eames or publicly, the innuendo is
that there's wrongdoing, they found something on him.
THE COURT:
question.

Well, that goes back to my other

Suppose he had went on?
MR. LEVIHE:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
There's nothing to indicate that the

Mayor knows anything other than there's still an open file
as far as the City Police Department is concerned, according
to your deposition.

Or at least the quote you stated from

the deposition, and that the file is still open.

But that

doesn't mean that—you say, "Well, the Mayor should have gone
on and revealed or stated that he was taking chicken eggs or
money or whatever,1' but there is nothing that you allege in
here that he knows anything other than his administrative
investigation is closed and that he's making no comment about
other investigations, which is presumably the City Police
Department which is still open, I suppose, from what you've
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1

told m e .

2

MR. LEVIIIR:

W e l l , you know, he should h a v e stopped

3

right t h e r e .

"Mr. Eames is terminated, the administrative

4

investigation is complete."

5

uttered those few extra w o r d s , "No comment on any o t h e r

6

investigation will b e made by m e or my o f f i c e , " I think that

7

was an unsolicited response.

8

memorandum he w a s never asked as to any other investigation.

9

If he had been asked, if a reporter had asked h i m , " W e l l ,

10

w h a t about the police investigation, what about the F . B . I .

U

investigation?" then I think he w o u l d have been right by

12

saying, "No comment."

13

effort in m y opinion to bring forth that unsolicited comment J

14

referring to other investigations, I think immediately he

15

creates b y innuendo the aura that he knows something m o r e ,

16

that there are other investigations taking p l a c e , that there

Once he w e n t the extra step and

It's clear at least from this

But w h e n he p u t s forth that extra

n J is wrongdoing in the air.
18

THE COURT:

So I get it correctly t h e n , you're

19 j relying o n his statement that "No comment on any other
20

investigations w i l l be m a d e " as the nexus of y o u r theory

21 j o f defamation and wilfull and malicious statements as
22

against M r . Eames?

I'm simply trying to narrow down the

23 I i s s u e s .
24
25

MR. L E V I N E :
file)

Yeah.

Let m e j u s t — ( E x a m i n i n g the
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1

THE COURT:

In o t h e r w o r d s , if he had said,

investigation

has closed,"

and if he'd

"The

2

administrative

3

right there and had not said,

4

investigations will be m a d e , " would y o u say then there would

5

have been no cause of

6

MR. L E V I N " :

"Mo c o m m e n t o n any o t h e r

action?
N o , b e c a u s e I think you also have

7

take into a c c o u n t that M r . Eantes was never informed as

8

w h a t h e w a s b e i n g investigated

9

T H E COURT:

10
11

stopped

to

to

for,

How d o e s that d e f a m e him if h e w a s n ' t

informed?
MR. LEVINE:
Once

12

that p o i n t .

13

first suspended

W e l l , b e c a u s e it b e c a m e p u b l i c at

the M a y o r fired M r . E a m e s , going

back—

him—

14

T H E COURT:

15

MR. L E V I N E :

Uh-huh.
—and

s a i d , "An investigation is going

16

o n , " and y o u don't comment about the results of the i n v e s t i -

17

gation or w h a t you a r e i n v e s t i g a t i n g , and then there is a

18

t e r m i n a t i o n , that again is a defamatory action t o o .

19

So in addition to the s t a t e m e n t , I'm also

20
21
22
23

that the actions t h a t took place also are
THE COURT:

defamation.

Are you saying it's defamation then in

a negative sort o f way not to say
MR. L E V I N E :

saying

something?

I think if any city official

takes

24

the initiative

to o p e n their m o u t h and m a k e comments o n

the

25

firing, t e r m i n a t i o n , or i n v e s t i g a t i o n s that's taking p l a c e ,
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1

I feel that that imposes upon them an affirmative duty,

2

especially in light of the fact when these comments and the

3

I situation involved is a tense situation, that a reasonable

4
5

6

man would know it could cause harm to another individual's
] standing in the community and reputation, they have an
affirmative duty upon them to carry through with their state-

7

I merits and make sure that a defamation does hot occur, and

8

j that is by letting it out to the public and Mr. Eames as to

9
10
11

what happened.
In other words, if you set the stage for defamation, if you set the stage and act in a way which you unrea-

12

j sonably know i s going to cause injury to an i n d i v i d u a l ' s

13

' reputation, s t a t u s in the community, which the Mayor did by

14

making those statements, and I think a reasonable man would

15

have known that the comments such as this and under the

16

circumstances and the relationships of the parties was going

17

to cause injury to this man's status in the community, then

18

you have an affirmative duty, which the Mayor did not abide

19

by his duty.

20

making full disclosure so as to avoid the defamation.

21

when you leave everything hanging in the air after making

22
23

He breached his duty by carrying through and
But

such statements, that's defamatory, and that's the essence
of our first cause of action.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. LEVIKE:

We're saying—

And the rest of them.
And the rest of them, right.

And the
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1

words too.

2

THE COURT;

Okay.

3

MR. LEVIHE:

4

MR. BARRETT:

Thank you.

Sure.
I'm going to be very brief, Your

5

Honor.

6

It states factual natter in there and not legal conclusions.

7

Mr. Levine objects to it on the ground that it's self-

8

serving.

9

come in as an exception to the hearsay rule, but I never

I'd just like to comment on the Mayor's affidavit.

Nell, we know that a self-serving statement may

10

heard of an affidavit that anybody made anywhere that wasn't

11

self-serving.

12

and so it's a lot of nonsense to try to dispose of it by

13

saying that it's self-serving.

14

That's the purpose of making an affidavit,

They haven't rebutted anything in that affidavit.

15

I certainly think that all four claims or all four causes

16

of action are entirely reliant upon the statement of facts

17

in the first claim and that that first claim is woefully
deficient.

19

To say that the Mayor defamed somebody by saying,

I "I have no comment," really opens the door.

20

Or to say that

someone is defamed because someone says, "An investigation is

21 J going on" really opens the door too.

It's just ridiculous.

The law of defamation isn't about that at all.
23 I
24

25

N O W , the court can take judicial notice of the

I fact that Mr. Eames filed an action in the United States
District Court alleging and attempting to show a lot of
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th ings that Mr. Levine has been bringing up here, that is
that the Mayor had some sort of a duty to give Mr. Earaes a
hearing.
Well/ the fact is that that action was dismissed
because Mr. Eames didn't ask for a hearing and t a k e —
MR. LEVINE:

I'm going to object, Your Honor.

I

don't think a District Court action has any bearing in this
case.
MR. BARRETT:

It's a matter of record.

I think it

does.
THE COURT:

Well, I could take judicial notice of

it, but I don't think it's relevant, for this reason:

That

counsel for Mr. Eames has just stated that they're not
contesting the right of the Mayor to fire him.
MR. BARRETT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Yes.

So whether he has a hearing or whether

he asks for one is not relevant.
MR. BARRETT:

Mo, that may not be—that may be

so here, but there's been an awful lot of talk about an
duty
affirmative/foii the part of the Mayor to have some sort of
a news conference or something, and I don't think there is
any such duty nor had that point even been raised until
today, and so we'll submit it.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I'll give you a written

decision on that, and you should have it v/ithin the next two
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1

days.

Two or three days.

2

MR. LEVINE:

3

THE COURT:

4

J

Thank you very .much, Your Honor.
Court's in recess.

(Court thereupon recessed at 2:55 p.m.)

5
6
7
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CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, LICo N0 o 27,

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS EAMES,
PLAINTIFF,

CIVIL CASE NO.

21426

DEPOSITION OF:

VS.
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, A
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; NEWEL
G. DAINES, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LOGAN,
UTAH; DOES 1 THROUGH 25,
INCLUSIVE,

DALE 0. NELSON

DEFENDANTS.

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 23RD DAY OF MAY,
1984, THE DEPOSITION OF DALE 0. NELSON, CALLED AS A WITNESS
AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PLAINTIFF, WAS TAKEN BEFORE LORI
PARKER, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL
REPORTER, AND NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH,
HOLDING C.S.R. LICENSE NUMBER 210, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF
2:30 P.M. OF SAID DAY AT THE CACHE COUNTY HALL OF JUSTICE,
ROOM 201, 160 NORTH MAIN, LOGAN, UTAH.
THAT SAID DEPOSITION WAS TAKEN PURSUANT TO
NOTICE.

LORI PARKER, C.S.R., R.P.R.

1 THE BASIS OF INFORMATION THAT'S GOING AROUND, BUT, AS I SAY,
2 IT HASN'T INFLUENCED ME.
3

Q

YOU KNOW DOUG, AND YOU--

4

A

BECAUSE I KNOW DOUG WELL ENOUGH.

5

Q

YOU KNOW THAT, IN YOUR MIND, THESE ALLEGATIONS

6 ARE NOT TRUE?
7

A

THAT'S THE WAY I WOULD INTERPRET IT.

8

Q

HAVE YOUR QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ALLEGED

9 WRONGDOINGS, HAVE THEY BEEN ANSWERED IN YOUR MIND?
10

A

WELL, THE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN SAID HAVEN'T BEEN

11 ANSWERED TO ANYBODY, I DON'T THINK, BUT THEY HAVEN'T
12 INFLUENCED ME, AS I HAVE SAID.

I DON'T KNOW WHAT KIND OF AN

13 ANSWER YOU'RE SEARCHING FOR THERE.
(u)\

Q

WELL, JUST, YOU KNOW, TRUTHFULLY WHAT KIND OF AN

5)| IMPRESSION YOU GET FROM EVERYTHING THAT'S GOING ON AS
G)\ BASICALLY A RESIDENT OF THE CITY OF LOGAN.

THAT'S BASICALLY

17y>| WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET'.
Q8)

A

WELL, I THINK THE IMPRESSION THAT ONE GETS IS

(19J THAT --OF COURSE, IT'S EASY TO CONVICT A PERSON WITH
(ffi)\ CONVERSATION, AND THE IMPRESSION ONE GETS IS THAT THERE'S AN
/

V)\

INVESTIGATION GOING ON, THAT THERE'S BEEN SOME MISHANDLING OF

(jH

FUNDS, THERE'S BEEN SOME MISUSE OF PROPERTY, YOU KNOW, IN

^23J RELATIONSHIP TO THE JOB, AND THAT SORT OF THING, AND IT'S
/

2M NEVER BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THAT'S TRUE.

IT'S A LITTLE BIT ANNOYING TO ME AS A CITIZEN TO
SEE THOSE KINDS OF ALLEGATIONS AND NOT TO HAVE ANY
SUBSTANTIATION FROM INVESTIGATIONS OR OTHERWISE, AND
NEVER SEEN THAT.

I'VE

I'VE NEVER HEARD IT, SO, YOU KNOW, A PERSON

WOULD BE A LITTLE BIT DISTURBED AT NOT HAVING BETTER
INFORMATION, AND YET THE IMPLICATION IS THAT SOMEBODY'S NOT
DOING THE RIGHT THING AS FAR AS THE JOB IS CONCERNED.
8
9

Q

WERE THESE RUMORS AND IMPRESSIONS, AS BEST AS YOU

CAN REMEMBER AND THOSE THAT ARE PRESENT IN YOUR MIND, WERE

10 THEY IN THE AIR OR IN THE AREA PRIOR TO DOUG T S BEING
11 SUSPENDED IN MAY OF 1982?
12

A

NO.

13

Q

BEFORE THAT, WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION THAT YOU

THEY CAME AFTER THE SUSPENSION.

14 CAN RECALL^15

A

NO.

16

Q

--ABOUT DOUG AND POSSIBLE . . .

17

A

NO.

18

0

DO YOU KNOW FOR A FACT, BASED UPON YOUR PERSONAL

19 KNOWLEDGE, YOUR ACQUAINTANCE WITH DOUG AND OTHER PEOPLE IN
20 THE COMMUNITY THAT YOU KNOW THAT MAY NOT KNOW DOUG AS WELL,
21 DO YOU KNOW IF THERE ARE PEOPLE, FROM YOUR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
22 AND OPINION, THAT MAY HAVE AN IMPRESSION THAT DOUG MAY BE
!
23 GUILTY OF SOMETHING, PEOPLE THAT DON T KNOW DOUG AS WELL AS

24 YOU?
25

MR. BARRETT:

I OBJECT TO THAT QUESTION.

IT CALLS

10

1

CLEARLY FOR SPECULATION.

2

Q

3 OPINION.

(BY MR. LEVINE)

WELL, I'LL ASK YOU FOR YOUR

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT--LET ME

«

REPHRASE IT.

5

ACQUAINTANCE WITH DOUG, BEING A CITIZEN OF LOGAN, CACHE

6

COUNTY, LIVING IN THE AREA FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, HAVING

7

CONTACT AT THE UNIVERSITY, IS IT YOUR OPINION THAT THERE ARE

8

PEOPLE THAT YOU'VE COME IN CONTACT WITH THAT HAVE EXPRESSED

9

TO YOU A BELIEF THAT DOUG IS POSSIBLY GUILTY OF SOMETHING?

10
H

A

NO.

BASED UPON YOUR

THE PEOPLE I'VE TALKED TO HAVEN'T

INDICATED

THAT HE'S GUILTY OF ANYTHING.

12

13

I'LL TRY AND MAKE IT SIMPLER.

Q

ARE THEY GENERALLY PEOPLE WHO KNOW DOUG PRETTY

A

A LOT OF THEM.

WELL?

14

OF COURSE, I HAVEN'T DISCUSSED IT

15 WIDELY, SO THERE WOULD BE A LIMITATION ON HOW FAR THAT WOULD
16 GO.
17

Q

IN YOUR OPINION, BASED UPON YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF

18 DOUG AND THE AREA HERE AND BEING A LONG-TIME RESIDENT, DO YOU
19 FEEL THAT—I'LL GET THE EXACT WORDING, TOO--DO YOU FEEL THAT
20 THESE STATEMENTS GOING AROUND IMPUTE TO DOUG THE COMMISSION
21 OF A CRIME OR DEGRADE HIS CHARACTER?
22

A

YES, I THINK THEY DO.

23

MR. BARRETT:

I THINK I'LL OBJECT TO THAT QUESTION ON

24 THE GROUND IT'S EXTREMELY LEADING.
25 ANSWER.

IN FACT, IT SUGGESTS THE

YOU HAVEN'T EVEN STATED WHAT THE ALLEGATIONS ARE.

11

1

HE'S ANSWERED " Y E S " W I T H O U T

2

SO-CALLED RUMORS ARE THAT ARE GOING

3

MR. LEVINE:

4

Q

WELL,

YOUR EVEN STATING W H A T

I'LL

6

THEY DO, IF A N Y T H I N G , TO DOUG'S

7

HELD OR HIS P R O F E S S I O N , T R U S T , ET
A

W E L L , THE REASON

IMPRESSION

" Y E S " IS

TO BE RAMPANT RELATIVE

11

MISAPPROPRIATION

12

ON THE JOB AND THAT SORT OF THING.

13

GIVE THE ANSWER

14

INDICATED A W R O N G D O I N G

THAT W O U L D

THE

Q

WHEN WE T A L K - - E X C U S E

16

A

THAT'S THE BASIS ON WHICH

17

Q

NOW, ARE YOU BASING THIS ON ANY ONE

18

THAT YOU RECALL BEING M A D E , OR

19

THE CIRCUMSTANCES

ME FOR

LEAD ME

TO

TOTALITY.

COME OUT AMD SAY

21

NEWSPAPERS

22

INVESTIGATION AND NEVER

INTERRUPTING.

I ANSWERED.
STATEMENT

23

CASUAL CONVERSATION

24

SOMEBODY

25

EXPECTED TO PERFORM, THEN Y O U ' R E

I THINK THAT W H E N

THAT LOGAN CITY

PEOPLE

IS NOT DOING THINGS

OF

NOW?
THE

IS M A K I N G

AN

COME UP WITH ANYTHING AND THEN

I HEAR

HAVE

IS IT THE W H O L E T O T A L I T Y

FROM START UP UNTIL

THE WHOLE

THINGS

SORT.

15 I

A

TO

THE

IN OTHER W O R D S , THE RUMORS

OF SOME

HE

BECAUSE

OF FUNDS A N D MISUSE OF THE M A T E R I A L

I DID.

THAT

THAT ARE GOING A R O U N D AND

CONVERSATION

THAT

YOU

CETERA?

I ANSWERED

WE'VE TALKED A B O U T THE RUMORS
THAT SEEMS

IS YOUR

LET

CHARACTER OR O F F I C E W H I C H

10

20

THAT.

THE RUMORS W H I C H YOU TESTIFIED T O — I ' L L

SAY W H A T THE RUMORS WERE A B O U T - - W H A T

9

AROUND.

TRY AND REPHRASE

5

8

THE

SUGGEST OR

IMPLY

ACCORDING TO THE W A Y

IN

THAT
THEY'RE

LED TO BELIEVE THAT THESE THINGS

12

1

E X I S T , B U T , AS

2

WANT THE PERSON C O N V I C T E D UNTIL THERE'S MORE EVIDENCE

3

WHAT YOU

4

Q

I SAID,

I DON'T BELIEVE THEM BECAUSE

AND W H A T

IS YOUR OPINION OR

IMPRESSION AS

WHERE THESE RUMORS OR ALLEGATIONS OF W R O N G D O I N G

6

LIE?

8
9

A

WHERE

WHERE THEY COME
Q

DO

I THINK

THEY COME FROM?

DO YOU H A V E AN OPINION AS TO HOW

IMPRESSIONS, R U M O R S , S T A T E M E N T S , HOW THEY

11

WHO CAN QUELL

12

A

WELL,

I THINK

KNOWN FROM'THAT

15

IN THE NEWSPAPERS

16

SOMETHING EVENTUALLY W O U L D

17

ANYTHING

20

ORIGINALLY

MR. B A R R E T T :

E V O L V E , BUT

I'VE

NEVER

READ

THAT

SEEN

TWO YEARS

ALL THESE

AGO?

IT IS THE

QUESTIONS

I OBJECT TO THEM AND HAVE A

CONTINUING

GROUND.

(BY M R .

LEVINE)

YOU CAN ANSWER.

THE

WILL BE NOTED.
A

MADE

QUESTIONS?

LEADING QUESTION.

OBJECTION ON THAT

QUELLED

BEING

SO IS IT YOUR O P I N I O N , ONCE A G A I N , T H A T

22

25

COULD BE

THAT THAT WAS ONGOING AND

TAKE P L A C E , A N D THAT'S BEEN W H A T ?

HAVE BEEN LEADING, AND

24

THESE

YOU ASSUME FROM W H A T YOU

CITY OF LOGAN WHO M U S T A N S W E R THESE

Q

KNOW

CAN BE Q U E L L E D OR

THE ONLY WAY THEY

INVESTIGATION.

21

23

I DON'T

INVESTIGATION WITH THE FACTS

14

19

STEM FROM OR

THEM?

13 WOULD BE A FORMAL

Q

TO

FROM.

10

18

THAN

HEAR.

5

7

I DON'T

YOU W A N T ME TO ANSWER THE

QUESTION?

OBJECTION

13

1

Q

YES.

2

A

YEAH.

I W O U L D THINK

THAT

3

THE ALLEGATIONS

4

TO BE ANSWERED

IN ONE WAY OR A N O T H E R .

5

DETERMINE WITH

THE PUBLIC

6

ANSWERED.

7

AND

MR. L E V I N E :

10
11

THE SOURCE

I M P L I C A T I O N S , THEN C E R T A I N L Y
AS FAR AS

INFORMATION, NOTHING

I HAVE NO FURTHER

8
9

IF THAT'S

THEY

OUGHT

I CAN

HAS

BEEN

QUESTIONS.

EXAMINATION
BY MR.

BARRETT:
Q

THIS MATTER

M R . N E L S O N , HAVE YOU TALKED TO M R . LEVINE
BEFORE

THIS DEPOSITION

ABOUT

TODAY?

12

A

WHO?

13

Q

MR.

14

A

NO.

15

Q

HAVE YOU TALKED TO MR. E A M E S - -

16

A

NO.

17

Q

- - A B O U T THIS CASE AT

ALL?

18

A

NO.

TODAY?

19

Q

YES .

20

A

I CASUALLY

LEVINE.

YOU MEAN BEFORE

TALKED TO HIM AFTER

21

G U E S S , ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO AND ASKED HIM

22

ANYTHING TO THE A L L E G A T I O N S

23

NEVER GOT ANY

24

Q

ALL R I G H T .

25

A

YES.

IT H A P P E N E D , I

IF THERE

WAS

AND THIS SORT OF THING, BUT I

INFORMATION.
ARE YOU RELATED

TO M R .

EAMES?

OF

